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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF BITZER'S THEORY OF 
RHETORICAL SITUATION 
1 
In this paper, I argue that the academic conversation surrounding Lloyd 
Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation has not taken into account the social 
implications that arise from the theory, given the unique historical moment of global 
capitalism. One reason for this gap may be that the academic discussion has focused 
too much on the rhetorical situation's constituent of exigence. In an effort to move 
beyond the existing academic conversation regarding the rhetorical theory, I intend 
to reevaluate the theory of rhetorical situation in terms of what the theory is capable 
of doing and what the theory should do given the social and economic order of the 
present state of global capitalism. Ultimately, I hope to revitalize the rhetorical 
situation and show how it can be an extremely useful rhetorical theory given the 
economic and social order of global capitalism. 
Presented originally in "The Rhetorical Situation1" in 1968, Lloyd Bitzer's 
theory of the rhetorical situation constituted an effort, Bitzer claims, to "revive the 
notion of rhetorical situation, to provide at least the outline of an adequate 
conception of it, and to establish it as a controlling and fundamental concern of 
rhetorical theory" (2). To begin his endeavor, Bitzer distinguishes between 
rhetorical and non-rhetorical communication. Rhetorical communication is 
pragmatic in that "it comes into existence for the sake of something beyond itself; it 
functions ultimately to produce action or change the world" (3); whereas, non-
rhetorical discourse is discourse that is uttered for any other purpose than to 
acclimate humans to their environment (Le., poetry, discourse that occurs in a play, 
etc.). Bitzer clarifies this distinction by noting that that which is rhetorical changes 
1 I will refer to liThe Rhetorical Situation" as RS throughout the remainder of the document. 
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the world, though not through direct interaction with existing items in the world; 
rather it is "the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of 
thought and action" (Bitzer 3). Because this results in an overly general definition of 
rhetorical communication, Bitzer further qualifies what is rhetorical by advancing 
the claim that "so controlling is situation that we should consider it the very ground 
of rhetorical activity" (5). He explicitly states that it is "not the rhetor and not the 
persuasive intent, but the situation [that] is the source and ground of rhetorical 
activity" (Bitzer 7). 
After establishing this distinction between rhetorical and non-rhetorical 
discourse, Bitzer defines and discusses the components of the rhetorical situation: 
the rhetorical situation is "a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations 
presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially 
removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision 
or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence" (Bitzer 6). 
As the primary and organizing principle of the situation, then, exigence is defined as 
"an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to 
be done, a thing which is other than it should be" (6). That is, a rhetorical exigence is 
one that can be modified, and this modification must come through discourse (6). 
In addition to exigence, the two other constituents of the rhetorical situation 
are audience and constraints. A rhetorical audience is capable of being constrained 
to the point that they are influenced to modify the exigence; furthermore, when 
influenced to modify the exigence, the rhetorical audience must also be capable of 
actually modifying the exigence (Bitzer 7-8). The rhetor then uses the constraints of 
the situation, which consist of "persons, events, objects, and relations," to move the 
audience to modify the exigence (Bitzer 8). Bitzer notes that "standard sources of 
constraint include beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, 
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motives and the like; and when the orator enters the situation, his discourse not only 
harnesses constraints given by the situation, but provides additional important 
constraints-for example his personal character, his logical proofs, and his style" (8). 
To complete his project of outlining a theory of situational rhetoric, Bitzer 
then discusses the six general characteristics of the rhetorical situation. The first is 
that "neither the presence of formal features in the discourse nor persuasive effect in 
a reader or hearer can be regarded as reliable marks of rhetorical discourse: A 
speech will be rhetorical when it is a response to the kind of situation which is 
rhetorical" (9). Here, Bitzer moves his theory away from centering on the rhetor's 
intentions and the discourse itself, and thus moves his theory of the rhetorical 
situation away from previous rhetorical theories. Overall, then, "The Rhetorical 
Situation" focuses on the situational components that bring about rhetorical 
discourse rather than on stylistics, invention methodology, or audience, and in this 
first characteristic of the rhetorical situation Bitzer sets his theory apart from others. 
The next three characteristics then describe the constrained relationships 
among the rhetor, audience, and situation. Specifically, the second characteristic 
explains that the situation "invites a fitting response, a response that fits the 
situation" (Bitzer 9), and the third is that the situation prescribes its fitting response. 
The situation's capacity to prescribe the response means that, through the situation, 
the audience measures the rhetor's response to determine whether it is a fitting 
response. The fourth general characteristic of the rhetorical situation then holds that 
the exigence and the complex of persons, objects, events and relations which 
generate rhetorical discourse are located in reality, are objective and publicly 
observable historic facts in the world we experience, are therefore available 
for scrutiny by an observer or critic who attends to them. To say that the 
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situation is objective, publicly observable, and historic means that it is real or 
genuine-that our critical examination will certify its existence. (Bitzer 11) 
The fifth general characteristic of the rhetorical situation is that "rhetorical 
situations exhibit structures which are simple or complex, and more or less 
organized" (11). A simple rhetorical situation, according to Bitzer, has few 
meaningful elements, whereas a complex situation contains many functioning 
elements. Likewise, a simple rhetorical situation is organized or highly structured 
when "all of its elements are located and readied for the task to be performed" 
(Bitzer 11). For example, an organized situation may be a courtroom, where the 
judge, jury, and attorneys know the roles they will be expected to fill as the situation 
plays itself out. 
Complex rhetorical situations, then, may be disorganized or loosely 
structured due to their "complexity or disconnectedness" (Bitzer 12). Bitzer lists 
numerous causes of complexity or disconnectedness: 
(a) a single situation may involve numerous exigences; (b) exigences in the 
same situation may be incompatible; (c) two or more simultaneous rhetorical 
situations may compete for our attention, as in some parliamentary debates; 
(d) at a given moment, persons composing the audience of situation A may 
also be the audience of situations B, C, and D; (e) the rhetorical audience may 
be scattered, uneducated regarding its duties and powers, or it may dissipate; 
(f) constraints may be limited in number and force, and they may be 
incompatible. (12) 
However, Bitzer is careful to point out that the causes of complexity and 
disconnectedness of a rhetorical situation are innumerable, and his list is by no 
means exhaustive. 
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The sixth general characteristic of rhetorical situations is that they have a 
temporal element. Bitzer explains that rhetorical situations "come into existence, 
then either mature or decay or mature and persist-conceivably some persist 
indefinitely. In any case, situations grow and come to maturity; they evolve to just 
the time when a rhetorical discourse would be most fitting" (12). Because of this 
temporal quality, Bitzer writes that "every rhetorical situation in principle evolves to 
a propitious moment for the fitting rhetorical response. After this moment, most 
situations decay" (12-13). However, some situations persist over time and have 
resulted in "a body of truly rhetorical literature" (Bitzer 13). Examples include works 
such as Plato's Apology and Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Bitzer explains that 
these are "rhetorical responses for us precisely because they speak to situations 
which persist-which are in some measure universal" (Bitzer 13). Moreover, some 
situations recur; this recurrence, according to Bitzer, may be due to either "the 
nature of things or conventions" (13). As examples, Bitzer refers to the courtroom 
setting and the tradition of the inaugural address. Due to the recursive nature of 
these situations, he argues that a discourse develops that accrues power and also 
becomes a "constraint upon any future response in the form" (Bitzer 13). 
After circumscribing rhetorical discourse, defining the rhetorical situation 
and its constituent parts, and offering six general characteristics of the rhetorical 
situation, Bitzer concludes by philosophically legitimating his theory of rhetoric. For 
this, he compares the situational view of rhetoric to the scientific method. The 
scientific method is accepted philosophically, he claims, because "it provides 
principles, concepts, and procedures by which we come to know reality" (13). 
Similarly, rhetoric "provides principles, concepts, and procedures by which we 
effect valuable changes in reality" (14). Thus, instead of understanding rhetoric to 
be merely concerned with argument or persuasion (although Bitzer argues that both 
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may be part of a rhetorical act), Bitzer argues for a philosophical conception of 
rhetoric, which understands rhetoric to be the means of human reconciliation with 
the world. 
In 1980, Bitzer revised his concept of the rhetorical situation in a book chapter 
entitled "Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective.2" Instead of a 
heavily revised theory of the rhetorical situation, however, "Functional 
Communication" rendered a more detailed account of the rhetorical situation than 
Bitzer had previously described. While the definition of the rhetorical situation 
remained the same, "Functional Communication" extended the discussion of each 
element of the rhetorical situation, including environment, constraints, and exigence. 
However, very little, if anything, reveals a change in Bitzer's understanding or use 
of these concepts from their initial descriptions in "The Rhetorical Situation." 
Additionally, Bitzer offered a lengthy discussion of responsiveness to exigence, the 
evolution of situations, and fitting responses. "Functional Communication" thus 
offered an extended heuristic for understanding, analyzing, discussing, and 
evaluating the situation in which rhetorical acts occur. 
From the outset, however, the critical attention paid to "The Rhetorical 
Situation" was mostly negative, with critics merely attempting to refute the theory 
by attacking the constituents of the situation. The most notable critique of the 
rhetorical situation came from Richard Vatz in his 1974 article, "The Myth of the 
Rhetorical Situation." Arguing from a sophistic or rhetorical view of reality rather 
than a philosophical view, Vatz proposed that "rhetoric is a cause not an effect of 
meaning" (160). According to Vatz, the rhetorical situation overlooked the fact that 
rhetors choose the exigences to which they respond and give salience. Because the 
2 I will refer to "Functional Communication: A Situational Perspective" as FC throughout the 
remainder of the essay. 
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rhetorical situation, as conceived by Bitzer, does not account for the rhetor's choice, 
and instead ascribes the exigence prescriptive tendencies, Vatz concludes that the 
rhetor in the theory of rhetorical situation is absolved of any responsibility 
regarding hislher discourse and is ultimately absolved of any responsibility for 
certain exigences going unaltered. Vatz closes his essay by writing that "it is only 
when the meaning is seen as the result of a creative act and not a discovery, that 
rhetoric will be perceived as the supreme discipline it deserves to be" (161). 
The emphasis on rhetoric as a "discipline" in these words reveals that Vatz' 
concern is with rhetoric and its academic status as an area of study. While I believe 
that Vatz is correct to attack the selective recognition of exigence, the ultimate 
concern of my essay is not the welfare of rhetoric as a discipline, but the power of 
rhetoric to act in the world. That is, Bitzer's rhetorical situation is concerned with 
the ways humans change the world to ensure survival and flourishing, and yet, as I 
will show, the theory does little more than explain how humans might change the 
world. My interest, in contrast, is in with how the rhetorical situation can be altered, 
the perspective shifted, to make this seemingly explanatory theory into a critical 
theory capable of changing the world. My specific concern here to explore how 
rhetoric can be used to alleviate exigences that exist because of the systemic 
inequalities that arise in the global capitalist economy. 
However, before altering the theory of rhetorical situation, we must first 
understand the theory's place in the history of rhetoric. In the following chapter, I 
will situate the rhetorical situation between Aristotle, who represents a 
philosophical approach to the effects of discourse in the world, and Foucault, who 
represents a more rhetorical approach to the effects of discourse. It is in the 
differences and similarities between the theories of these two rhetoricians that we 
see what Bitzer's theory has to offer. 
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CHAPTER 2. SITUATING THE RHETORICAL SITUATION IN THE WESTERN 
RHETORICAL TRADITION AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOPHISM 
AND CAPITALISM 
In chapter one, I summarized Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation. In this 
chapter, I intend to situate the theory of rhetorical situation historically in the greater 
Western rhetorical tradition and explain my understanding of the relationship 
between sophism and capitalism. Situating Bitzer's theory among other established 
rhetorical theories will illustrate two ways that the rhetorical situation provides 
value for the concept of rhetoric. First, Bitzer's theory maintains an orderly nature 
through its use of categories; this organization is consistent with Aristotle's 
philosophical framework and allows the rhetorical situation to serve as a heuristic 
for understanding the role rhetoric plays in the increasingly chaotic reality of 
contemporary life. Secondly, despite maintaining an orderly nature, the theory also 
allows for contingency and situatedness, both of which are necessary to understand 
in a global system governed by the ubiquity of commodification and consumption 
that the capitalist economic order entails. In my discussion of sophism and 
capitalism, I explain the connection I see between sophistic concepts of contingency 
and situatedness and capitalism. 
To situate the theory and exemplify its unique qualities, I will compare and 
contrast Bitzer's theory with the rhetorical theories of Aristotle and Foucault. I have 
chosen Aristotle because of his position as the seminal figure in the Western 
rhetorical tradition, and I have chosen Foucault because he represents a post-
modem, neo-sophistic perspective in the Western tradition. More generally, 
Aristotle and Foucault are very different from each other, and positioning the 
rhetorical situation among these two thinkers will demonstrate that Bitzer's theory 
has a unique place in the greater Western rhetorical tradition. Moreover, I will show 
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that because of this unique place in the rhetorical tradition, Bitzer's theory must be 
reconsidered in light of the unique historical moment in which we currently find 
ourselves. In this chapter, then, I will compare and contrast the theories of Bitzer, 
Aristotle, and Foucault in three areas: the nature of rhetoric (what is rhetoric?), the 
purpose of rhetoric (what should rhetoric do?), and the scope of rhetoric (what 
does/should the study of rhetoric encompass?). 
The Nature of Rhetoric 
In this section I will compare and contrast Bitzer, Aristotle, and Foucault's 
account of the nature of rhetoric, which is, essentially, the definition of rhetoric. For 
Bitzer, the nature or definition of rhetoric is "a mode of altering reality, not by the 
direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which 
changes reality through the mediation of [an audience's] thought and action" (RS 3-
4). In this formulation, rhetoric is not necessarily ornamental speech or even spoken 
language, as the thoughts and actions of an audience can be influenced through any 
type of speech or written communication. Central to this definition of rhetoric is the 
altering of reality: according to Bitzer, change in the environment must occur for 
rhetorical action to have taken place. Ultimately persuasion will have occurred in 
rhetoric, according to Bitzer's definition, when, through persuasion, an audience is 
motivated to alter its reality. 
Just as Bitzer's understanding of rhetoric hinges on the persuasion of an 
audience, persuasion is central to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as well: rhetoric, 
according to Aristotle, is the "faculty of observing in any given case the available 
means of persuasion" (1355b). That is, in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric, rhetoric has 
an end, persuasion, and to reach that end one must be aware of and draw on the 
given circumstances to invent a persuasive argument or discourse. While rhetoric's 
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end is more narrowly circumscribed in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric than it is in 
Bitzer's theory of rhetoric, Bitzer holds that persuasion must occur for the exigence 
to be remedied by an audience. Moreover, persuasion is a key aspect of the 
rhetorical situation, especially if the rhetor is not given an audience that perceives 
the exigence and constraints in the same way the rhetor perceives them. 
While Aristotle's and Bitzer's definitions of rhetoric both revolve around the 
notion of persuasion, Foucault's understanding of rhetoric-or discourse, to use his 
term - is not limited to the use of words for a specific purpose, such as persuasion. 
Instead, Foucault understands rhetoric to act upon materially and constitute the 
very idea of "reality." In Foucault's work, discourse does not describe the way 
humans neutrally transmit knowledge to other humans; instead, discourse, is 
"controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of 
procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance 
events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality" (216). Discourse thus has the 
ability to make a fundamental, material difference in the world, but what is made 
using discourse is determined by the person wielding it, and the study of discourse, 
or rhetoric, therefore has a different weight for Foucault than it does for Bitzer or 
Aristotle. Ultimately, the pressing concern facing those who study discourse, 
according to Foucault, is not the ends to which discourse is used (Le., persuasion, 
argument, etc.), but the question of who uses discourse, what counts as legitimate 
discourse, and what the use of legitimate discourse affords its users. 
While Foucault's understanding of rhetoric clearly differs from that of 
Aristotle or Bitzer, Foucault, like Bitzer, is concerned with bringing about material 
changes in the world via discourse3• That is, both see discourse as having material 
3 I want to make it clear to my readers that I know Bitzer and Foucault are approaching language from two very 
different philosophical view points. I make every attempt to clarify this in the text. 
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power in the world. It seems evident, however, that Foucault is more of a 
materialist than Bitzer, because discourse for Foucault is constitutive of the world in 
a way that discourse is not for Bitzer. For Foucault, discourse represents the ways 
humans organize their experiences of reality4 and thus, through discourse, humans 
come to know "reality." Accordingly, Foucault views reality to be a social 
construction shaped by historical and material influences that have brought about 
changes in the discourse of a population. Still, though, material reality and the 
material effects of discourse are primary for Bitzer as well, as humans use language 
to navigate reality and influence the actions of other humans5• 
As for the historical placement of Bitzer's understanding of the nature of 
rhetoric, we can see that it connects to both Aristotle's traditional understanding of 
rhetoric and Foucault's post-modem, neo-sophistic understanding of discourse. For 
both Bitzer and Aristotle, rhetoric involves persuasion in some central way, since 
persuasion for Aristotle is the ultimate end of rhetoric and is for Bitzer the result of a 
positively modified exigence. While knowing that persuasion is key for both 
Aristotle and Bitzer does not clarify how both theorists make use of categories and 
heuristics to operate within a given situation, it is nevertheless important to note 
that both theorists focus on persuasion, as it is in the means of persuasion that both 
Aristotle and Bitzer offer their categories and heuristics. I discuss Aristotle's and 
Bitzer's understandings of the means of persuasion below, when I discuss the scope 
of rhetoric. As for the relationship between Foucault and Bitzer, both similarly 
4 When using the term reality, I am referring to other environmental objects that exist outside the human person, 
such as trees, cars, houses, chairs, other humans, etc. 
5 An expansion on this point: As I understand Bitzer, a human could survive in the world without learning a 
language, but this existence would be very simple. When the situation becomes complex, with more forces 
interacting upon the person, the person could increasingly use the aid of other humans. By learning language, a 
human becomes able to draw upon the wealth of aid that other humans represent and better navigate reality. 
12 
emphasize the power of discourse to act in the world materially. Both theorists thus 
see discourse as a force that can act to change and shape the world. 
The Purpose of Rhetoric 
To continue situating the theory of rhetorical situation among other theories 
in Western rhetorical tradition, I will now consider the Bitzer's, Aristotle's, and 
Foucault's understanding of the purpose of rhetoric or rhetorical study. Such a 
discussion will illustrate how Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation offers helpful 
heuristic categories for understanding the complex web of contemporary reality. 
Additionally, a discussion of Bitzer's, Aristotle's, and Foucault's understanding of 
the purpose of rhetoric will reveal that, although the rhetorical situation contains 
organizing categories and constituents, the theory also accounts for contingency and 
situatedness. Ultimately, a better understanding of the theory of rhetorical situation 
arrived at through a discussion of the three theorists' understanding of the purpose 
of rhetoric will allow a thorough understanding of the particular aspects of the 
theory of rhetorical situation that are relevant to our discussion of the theory of 
rhetorical situation and the current historical moment of global capitalism. 
We can begin exploring the purpose of rhetoric in Bitzer's theory by noting 
that the rhetorical situation centers on the fact that human beings functionally 
interact with their environment. Rhetoric, for Bitzer, is the means through which 
human beings use discourse to "achieve harmonious adjustment with the 
environment" (FC 21). According to Bitzer's theory, harmonious adjustment occurs 
after discourse presented to an audience leads the audience positively to modify an 
exigence. This positive modification of an exigence usually involves the rhetor's use 
of persuasion; either the rhetor makes the audience understand the exigence to be an 
authentic exigence and thus modify it, or the rhetor merely persuades the audience 
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to modify the exigence. Persuasion most likely occurs because no stipulation in the 
theory of the rhetorical situation mandates that any person other than the rhetor 
necessarily sees an aspect of the environment as being exigent. 
Since, for Bitzer, only the rhetor must see an exigence present in the 
environment, exigence is often an open topic for debate between the rhetor and 
his/her audience. Similarly, Aristotle's understanding of the purpose of rhetoric 
focuses on the debatable. In section 1356b of the Rhetoric, Aristotle writes that 
the duty of rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon 
without arts or systems to guide us [ ... ] The subjects of our deliberation 
are such as seem to present us with alternative possibilities: about 
things that could not have been, and cannot now or in the future be, 
other than they are, nobody who takes them to be of this nature wastes 
his time in deliberation. 
We see that for Aristotle, the purpose of rhetoric is to discuss that for which no 
simple answers or tested methods offer guidance. It is because of rhetoric's focus on 
that which is without a conclusive answer that rhetoric, for Aristotle, is ultimately 
concerned with persuasion. After arriving at what appears to be the best option, a 
rhetor must be capable of persuading others of the correctness or plausibility of that 
decision. How the rhetor goes about persuading an audience, according to Aristotle, 
reveals more similarities between Aristotle's rhetorical theory and Bitzer's rhetorical 
theory, but will be discussed in the section concerning the scope of rhetoric. 
Generally, a similarity exists between Bitzer's and Aristotle's understanding 
of the purpose of rhetoric, in that rhetoric involves the negotiation of debatable 
topics. But it becomes apparent that Bitzer's understanding of the purpose of 
rhetoric is also similar to Foucault's when we consider the materiality of discourse in 
Foucault and Bitzer. Foucault's overall theory of language is quite complicated, but 
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ultimately his project concerning the study of discourse is centered on analyzing 
how the structure of discourse impacts social institutions (i.e., marriage, family, 
religion, etc.) and social relations, which in tum affect-and, in fact, are-material 
reality. Ultimately, the purpose of the discipline of rhetoric for Foucault is to study 
how language and institutions interrelate to affect social relations. While the end of 
rhetoric is different for Foucault than it is for Bitzer, both appreciate the material 
effects discourse has on society and material reality. For Foucault, language is 
prescriptive, in that the structure of discourse dictates human perception and 
understanding of the reality, whereas for Bitzer, language is a tool humans use to 
bring about conditions in the world that allow for their survival and flourishing. 
And while Foucault's end in rhetorical study is to find ways to disrupt the 
prescriptive nahue of language, the end of rhetorical study for Bitzer is to 
understand how humans use language to acclimate themselves to their 
surroundings. Their projects can be considered similar if one understands Foucault 
to describe the prescriptive nature of language as an exigence, which he seems to do, 
given the way language categorizes persons and gives and takes away their voice. 
Again, in this comparison/contrast of Bitzer's rhetorical situation with the 
rhetorical theories of Aristotle and Foucault, we see that the rhetorical situation 
shares similarities with both of these theories. In general, the theory of rhetorical 
situation allows us to understand rhetorical communication in traditional terms (i.e., 
there is a rhetor, an audience, and some cause for communicating) in a fashion 
similar to Aristotle's theory of rhetoric, and yet at the same time Bitzer's theory 
allows us to see the plethora of constituents momentarily in place in the fleeting 
situation, which in tum enables us to understand the multiple influences that impact 
the rhetorical situation. Ultimately, as Aristotle's theory of rhetoric bridged the 
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sophists and Plato, Bitzer's theory of rhetoric seems to bridge Aristotle's theory of 
rhetoric and the neo-sophistic theory of rhetoric in Foucault. 
The Scope of Rhetoric 
Continuing the comparison and contrast of Bitzer's theory of rhetoric with 
Aristotle's and Foucault's theories of rhetoric, I will now discuss the three theorists' 
understanding of the scope of rhetoric. Through the discussion of these theorists' 
understanding of the scope of rhetoric I am hoping to illustrate the historical and 
conceptual location of the theory of rhetorical situation in the greater Western 
rhetorical tradition. I am also hoping to show that while the theory of rhetorical 
situation maintains an orderly system of constituents where to make sense of the 
situation its perceivers are asked to apply a structure of understanding upon the 
situation's various components and yet at the same time the theory allows various 
combinations of the situation's components to exercise variable and equally 
legitimate levels of influence in determining the outcome of a situation. Again, my 
claim is that the theory of rhetorical situation bridges Aristotle's more analytical 
theory of rhetoric and the more sophistic theory of the post-modem era; in this case 
my example theorist is Foucault. 
I will begin with Bitzer's understanding of the scope of rhetoric as it is 
revealed in his theory of rhetorical situation. The scope of rhetoric, for Bitzer, is 
hinted at in his understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetoric. As mentioned 
above, according to Bitzer, the nature of rhetoric is communication that alters a 
situation when introduced and the purpose of rhetoric is that communication which 
alters a situation when introduced be used to alter situations wherein something is 
perceived to be other than it should be. Therefore the scope of rhetoric is not limited 
to a specific discipline in the academy, but can encompass all disciplines and all 
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segments of life. Rhetoric, because of its expansive nature and purpose, becomes a 
social science according to Bitzer's theory. The focus is not on ornamental speech, 
although it may be necessary, rather the focus becomes on understanding how 
humans use language to interact with one another and with any other element 
within the total environment. Ultimately, the study of rhetoric should not be limited 
to speeches made by political figures or ad campaigns for the latest technological 
gadget. Nor should the study of rhetoric be merely concerned with argument, 
invention, or business communication. Rather, rhetoric, according to the theory of 
rhetorical situation, should include the study of psychology, sociology, philosophy, 
and some general knowledge of the history of the hard sciences as these are all areas 
of study that help humans better understand human behavior and environmental 
interaction. 
The scope of rhetoric seems to call for a study of all things for Bitzer, and for 
Aristotle, we see a similar recommendation for diversified knowledge. As was the 
case for Bitzer, the scope of rhetoric as it is understood by Aristotle can also be 
extrapolated from his understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetoric. To 
review, according to Aristotle the nature of rhetoric is to find the means of 
persuasion available in any given situation and the purpose of rhetoric is to use the 
available means of persuasion to persuade others in matters where there is no 
concrete knowledge or set precedents acting as a guide for action or understanding. 
The scope of rhetoric is broad for Aristotle because one cannot always know ahead 
of time what knowledge or skills one would need in order to persuade others in any 
given situation. Aristotle recommends drawing on basic propositions, such as 
possible vs. impossible, likely vs. unlikely, which are similar to the Topics. Basic 
perceptions of the situation may give a rhetor just enough of an understanding of a 
situation enabling himlher to persuade the audience. 
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While we see a similar call for diversity in general knowledge in Aristotle and 
Bitzer's understanding of the scope of rhetoric, the scope of rhetoric for Foucault is 
endless. Because Foucault sees rhetoric as being concerned with imposed structures 
of language and the social implications of such linguistic structures and because we 
can never know the world without first making sense of our experiences by filtering 
them trough language, we cannot restrict the scope of rhetoric. Rhetoric for 
Foucault seemingly consists then of the study of any use of language in any situation 
for any purpose. What Foucault is interested in is that we see the constitutive nature 
of language and the social implications of the structures within languages. 
For all three theorists we see a general agreement that the scope of rhetoric be 
broad. For Bitzer the scope of rhetoric is expansive because there is never only one 
field of study or area of life in which exigences occur. Similarly, the scope of 
rhetoric is broad for Aristotle because rhetors must be able to draw on present 
information or use the Topics in order to read the situation in a way that allows the 
rhetor to create persuasive communication. While Bitzer and Aristotle viewed the 
scope of rhetoric as being broad, Foucault differs in that his understanding of 
language leads the scope of the study of rhetoric to be endless. Because Foucault 
sees structures present within language as impacting human understanding of the 
world, the scope of rhetoric is not limited to the study of one type of human 
discourse, but is instead unlimited in that language and the implications its 
structures have on society is what should be the focus of study. Ultimately, Bitzer's 
understanding of the scope of rhetoric is more similar to Aristotle's understanding 
of rhetoric. It is this gap between the theory of rhetorical situation and Foucault's 
post-modern understanding of the implications of language that may be the source 
for Vatz's critique of the theory of rhetorical situation, and therefore, can be 
understood to be the beginning point of my critique of the theory of rhetorical 
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situation as well. I will devote the third chapter of this paper to further explanation 
of this point. 
The Relationship between Sophism and Capitalism 
Before I move on to the third chapter, I feel I should offer a quick explanation of the 
relationship I see between sophism and capitalism. This relationship must be 
explicated as the remaining discussion of this paper hinges on my understanding of 
the relationship between these two concepts/historical moments. The following is a 
discussion of three main terms that are important to sophism and capitalism: kairos, 
competition and contradiction. Each section offers a discussion of how I see the 
sophistic understanding of the term to be related to capitalism, as discussed in the 
book Empire, by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. 
Kairos 
Kairos is defined as "the right moment" and "the opportune" (White 13). For 
Sophists, the major concern with communication is that the communication fit the 
moment, the situation. We see this in A defense on Behalf of Palamedes when 
Gorgias, an exemplary sophist, writes "to what part of the defense shall I tum my 
attention? For an unsupported allegation creates evident perplexity, and because of 
the perplexity, it follows that I am at a loss in my speech, unless I discover 
something out of the truth itself and out of the present necessity" (55). Here, 
Gorgias points out that the situation will guide his defense speech and that without 
looking to the situation, it would be hard to know where and how to start his 
defense. 
Just as kairos thus guides the rhetoric of the Sophist, kairos similarly guides 
the players in late capitalism; the successful Sophist is able to adjust and adapt to 
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his/her situation, just as the successful individual under capitalism is able to adjust 
and adapt to his/her situation inside the socio-economic system of capitalism. Hardt 
and Negri claim that in the passage to the informational economy, one of the 
passages that has occurred enabling the world market to be actualized, the service 
industry reigns and that the "jobs [in the service industry] for the most part are 
highly mobile and involve flexible skills" (285). Additionally, Hardt and Negri go 
on to write that in the informational economy "we increasingly think like 
computers" (291). Considering Hardt and Negri compare human subjectivity to 
computers, an industry that is notorious for its perpetual change, it isn't hard to 
believe that adapting to our situations in the capitalist world market isn't easy. Not 
only do the changes in the economic markets make adaptation difficult, but in 
capitalism, a total system in constant flux, traditions are also constantly being 
broken in pursuit of profits.6 So, individuals are not just trying to cope with an ever 
increasing demand of flexible job skills, they also have to be prepared to be flexible 
with private matters, such as family structure, religion, etc., as well. In the 
Communist Manifesto, Marx summarizes the action of capitalism in the phrase: "all 
that is solid melts into air, all that is sacred is made profane" (248). In other words, 
there is nothing that capitalism will let be if it slows the movement of commodities. 
For example, the rating system of films can make or break the box office numbers of 
feature films in the U.S. Yet, certain groups maintain that the rating system is 
necessary to protect children and sensitive viewers. Under this system, however, a 
rating of NC-17 will prevent any person who is younger than 17 from attending the 
movie, thus reducing the possible number of tickets sold. Because of the bottom-line 
6 Hardt and Negri reference this tendency of capitalism when they write that capital operates "through relays 
and networks of relationships of domination, without reliance on a transcendent center of power. It tends 
historically to destroy traditional social boundaries, expanding across territories and enveloping always new 
populations within its processes" (326). 
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concerns, people in the film industry have been lobbying to be rid of the tradition of 
the rating system and traditional notions of appropriateness, precisely because the 
system reduces the movement of commodities, in this case tickets. 
While the film rating system does not seem as though it would be much for 
individuals to adapt to if missing, the generalized effect of the capitalist world 
market-and I think the Marx quote captures this-is that nothing is sacred. 
Deleuze and Guattari, two people who have studied this tendency, note the ability 
of capitalism to deterritorialize and reterritorialize; these terms refer to the way 
capitalism takes what Deleuze and Guattari call objective codes, such as myths and 
tragedies, and breaks them down, only to reinstitute them as subjective codes, such 
as the psychoanalytic use of the Oedipus complex to explain our libidinal energies. 
An argument can be made that this deterritorialization and reterritorialization has 
occurred in our conceptualization of commodities. For example, the reification of 
commodities that Georg Lukacs noted in his theory of rationalization is a clear 
example of an objective code, in this case the commodity, being broken down and 
reinstated as a subjective code. That is, the commodity that had once been a clear 
category of market goods has shifted to include anything; there is no longer any line 
between that which is a commodity and that which isn't a commodity. This is 
evident in our fundamental relationships, for example, when we measure our 
friends just as we measure our cars, by how far they can get us in the capitalist 
world market, even sincere friendships can not fall outside the system of commodity 
exchange. 
Another example of de territorialization occurring at the hands of capitalism, 
at least according to Hardt and Negri, is the deterritorialization of production. 
Immaterial labor allows for labor to be more and more de territorialized because 
laborers can 1/ stay at home and log on to the network" (296), because their work can 
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be done from any location. Instead of having a fixed position in the "territory" of 
corporate headquarters building, immaterial laborers cooperate from afar as 
members in a network working with one another by passing information along to 
get the job done. No longer do we have to physically go into work. As Hardt and 
Negri said, we can just log in to the network and get busy producing. It seems that 
only after an individual understands the situation, or kairos, of capitalism and the 
capitalist world market, he/her will be better able to function within the capitalist 
system. 
If capitalism throws everything into flux, individuals will not survive or 
succeed if they do not understand the importance of reading the situation, or kairos. 
In other words, capitalism has created the conditions of modern day Sophism. We 
need to always be ready for change. In classes, such as computer science, biology, 
composition, etc., instructors aren't teaching students how to do one complete task; 
instead, instructors show the students how to do many different parts of many 
different tasks. Writing program administrators and instructors, as well as 
administrators in other academic fields, have recognized that they can not send 
students out in the world having only taught them how to do one task really well, 
because if the situation changes and the one task is not longer primary, the student 
will be at a loss. More and more instructors are merely arming students with tools, 
such as flexibility and adaptability, specifically rhetorical knowledge, knowing that 
those tools will be the most important tools within the dynamic nature of the 
capitalist system the students will all to soon be entering. All this indicates that 
instructors are teaching, or trying to teach, kairos. 
Hardt and Negri understand the importance of understanding the situation it 
seems, when they place communication as one of the four foci of immaterial labor. 
Without successful communication, networking doesn't work. Without the person 
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you're working with being in the next cubicle, it is imperative that he/she be able to 
clearly express any thoughts he/she might have about his/her work. Without being 
there to clear up any miscommunication, knowing how to respond properly in the 
moment, to a specific situation is vital to making the network model, which Hardt 
and Negri emphasize greatly, work. 
Competition 
Just as kairos has become a central concept in the capitalist world market, 
competition has become emphasized as well. Protagoras, a famous sophist wrote, or 
perhaps said, that "on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other" 
(qtd. by Diogenes Laetirus IX 21). We can take this to mean that for every issue 
there are at least two ways to look at it. Similarly, Gorgias was notorious for 
offering an argument for one side of an issue and then turning around and arguing 
the other side just as persuasively. Language and its mastery was, for the Sophists, a 
competition. The reason for mastering language was to win a verbal competition; 
here, winning means that your view of the issue was the one the audience accepted 
as the most persuasive. In the "Encomium of Helen," Gorgias gives us another 
reason to want to master language when he writes: "speech is a powerful lord, 
which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it 
can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity" (44). If one masters 
speech, according to Gorgias, one has at his disposal "a powerful lord;" what more 
could you ask for when competing? 
Just as argument and the mastery of language focused on competition for the 
Sophists, competition is one of the forces, if not the driving force, in capitalism. The 
specific mode of competition in capitalism, in fact, is similar to that of Sophism. 
Protagoras has said that there is always more than one way to look at an issue and 
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that man is the measure of all things. If there is noting transcendental and all we 
have is the moment, which is a belief that is evidenced in Protagoras' aphorisms 
here, then language is central to experience (Lanham 4). If we can know nothing 
beyond language, then it seems the ability to master language becomes very 
important. It seems that capitalism has taken a lesson straight from the Sophists. 
That is, just as language is the basis of Sophistic competition, the commodity is all 
the system of capitalism can know so it seems that competition in capitalism is 
measured in commodities. If we can locate the Tylenol brand in the store, for 
example, how far do we have to look on the shelf before we see the Bayer or Hy-Vee 
brands of pain reliever? In capitalism, it is all about choice, which is analogous to 
Progatoras' multiple sides of the issue, even if the issue is merely minor pain relief. 
So individuals compete through using language in Sophism and in 
capitalism, competition centers around commodities and who can sell the most 
and/or consume/amass the most commodities. But what does it mean to win in 
Sophism? Richard Lanham writes that "at the heart of rhetorical reality lies 
pleasure. We personify for pleasure, we act for pleasure" (7). So, according to 
Lanham, the Sophists compete or debate for pleasure or that which brings them 
pleasure. It can be argued that when we compete in capitalism, we are also 
competing for pleasure. While Sophists gain pleasure when their view of the issue is 
deemed by that audience to be the more persuasive view, in capitalism, individuals 
gain pleasure from our social status and from our things, and we are able to gain 
social status by amassing commodities and capital. Capitalism trains its subjects to 
want the newest thing, the fastest thing, and we are taught to equate pleasure with 
commodity accumulation and social status; however, capitalist competition does not 
only occur at the individual level. Firms must also compete, but where individuals 
compete to accumulate commodities, firms compete to accumulate money capital, 
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and where individuals compete to achieve social status, firms also compete for 
status by being the wealthiest firm, wealth here being money and assets combined. 
So, how do firms and individuals win in capitalist competition? The secret to 
winning in capitalist competition really isn't a secret at all. The Sophists knew the 
answer more than 2000 years before the capitalist world market emerged. The secret 
is kairos. An example that points to how firms in the capitalist world market use 
kairos to compete and win in capitalism is Toyotism, or "just-in-time production." 
Hardt and Negri discuss how Toyotism is a productive model which is "striving 
toward a continual interactivity or rapid communication between production and 
consumption" (290). Rather than producing large quantities of the same 
commodities, in Toyotism, the goal is to be in contact with the consumers and to 
produce only that which is knowingly going to be consumed. This means catering 
to the market, or at least, pretending to cater to the consumers. Toyotism allows for 
more diversity among commodities produced, which in tum allows for individual 
competition. 
Just as firms win in capitalist competition through kairos, individuals must be 
aware of situations if they are to win in capitalism. If one were seeking a job, for 
example, she would get the job by properly understanding the moment and jumping 
at the ad in the paper. She is supposed to be happy, because now she will have the 
financial means to begin amassing commodities. After working at the job for 
awhile, she figures out the situation, how the competition works in this particular 
corporation, and soon she gets a promotion. Now she is making even more money 
and if she is very cunning, soon she'll be the CEO. The progression isn't' that fast in 
reality, but, according to bourgeois economists and apologists, supposedly in 
capitalism nothing should hold us back from that comer office. If we work hard 
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enough and really nail the kairos, we should be able to do anything we want. At 
least, that seems to be what the powers-that-be would have us believe. 
After we master the situation (kairos) and work our way up the totem pole at 
work, next we begin to compete for social status. Here is where the Sophistic belief 
in multiple sides to an issue comes into play in capitalist competition. By having 
more than one TV to choose from, for example, we have the ability to get one that 
we can afford for now, and we are also given something to strive for: the Toshiba 32 
in. flat-panel high-definition television. We compete for social status in part by 
amassing just the right amounts 0 just the right commodities, such as the Toshiba 
TV. But, the situation becomes complicated and kairos comes back 'into play here 
because part of the trick of achieving social status is not only being able to afford the 
commodity, but also being able to keep up with the trends that dictate what is "in" 
and what isn't "in." These are baseless fashions, rather than sincere needs. 
Another way that kairos is heavily called upon in capitalist competition is 
when individuals desperate for the commodities they must have in order to achieve 
the social status they are taught by the system to want capitalize on sales. The idea 
of buying something on sale has become a new form of competition in capitalism. It 
isn't only whether or not you have the newest, fastest computer, but more and more 
the focus extends to whether you paid the least amount possible for it. This "sale" 
competition is the multitude's version of the capitalist's game of who paid the most 
for what extravagance. Individuals in the capitalist system only achieve status by 
amassing the right commodities, sometimes at the right price. The commodities we 
amass and the social status the commodities give us are then our measures of 
pleasure. 
In summary, capitalism requires individuals to amass the right commodities 
to achieve social status, and to amass commodities we need jobs, just as it requires 
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firms to accumulate money capital and status through total wealth. Individuals get 
jobs and get the right commodities and firms get their money capital and assets only 
through the Sophistic values of competition and kairos. To get the job and succeed 
in the job and in order to amass commodities in a way that contribute to a high or 
higher social status, we need to read the situation, just as firms need to be able to 
read the markets and be able to cater to their consumer to accumulate money capital 
and more assets. We are so concerned with mastering commodities and capital in 
capitalism because the commodity is central, just as the Sophists were concerned 
with mastering language because language was central. If we are able to master the 
central element, we are able to master a "very powerful lord," as Gorgias said, or at 
least get that powerful lord on our side in the competition. 
Contradiction 
The third of Protagoras' beliefs that parallels important trends in the capitalist world 
market is his claim that "contradiction is impossible" (qtd. by O'Brien 5). When this 
aphorism is put next to Prtagoras' claim that "on every issue there are two 
arguments opposed to each other," what seems to result is nothing but 
contradiction. However, contradiction, as used by Protagoras, does not mean that 
disagreement and/or no multiplicity do not exist; rather, Protagoras' use of 
contradiction refers to the lack of an independent criterion, considering his belief 
that humans are the source of all. In other words, there is no contradiction because 
there is nothing to ground competing claims outside the system of language for 
Protagoras. While we may have two or more views on every issue, we will never 
have a way to measure on view of the issue to decipher whether it is the right or 
wrong view on the issue, because there is no transcendent criterion we can use as a 
measuring stick. 
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But Protagoras' claim that "contradiction is impossible" applies more than to 
language; capitalism, like language for the Sophists, has no contradictions. There is 
nothing that exists, or that can exist, outside the system. In other words, anything 
can be commodified; therefore, anything can be subsumed into the capitalist system. 
Nothing exists outside the system of capital and commodity exchange, just as 
nothing exists outside language for the Sophists. 
That nothing can exist outside the capitalist system may be the reason some 
theorists have announced the end of history. There is no other economic system. 
Capitalism has engulfed the world entirely, leading to the actualization of the world 
market. Hardt and Negri describe the world market in the following passage: 
Many of the concepts dear to postmodernists and postcolonialists find 
a perfect correspondence in the current ideology of corporate capital 
and the world market. The ideology of the world market has always 
been the anti-foundational and anti-essentialist discourse par 
excellence. Circulation, mobility, diversity, and mixture are its very 
conditions of possibility. Trade brings differences together and the 
more the merrier! Differences (of commodities, populations, cultures, 
and so forth) seem to multiply infinitely in the world market, which 
attacks nothing more violently than fixed boundaries: it overwhelms 
any binary division with its infinite multiplicities. (150) 
The fact that the world market ideology is anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist 
means that there isn't any real foundation or any external/transcendent truths upon 
which we can build our worldviews. Being anti-essentialist also hints towards the 
lack of any transcendental true essence that we can assume to be present and from 
which we can base our worldviews. What Hardt and Negri say, ultimately, is that 
in the world market, truth is very much up for grabs. Truth is established in the 
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world market much the way Sophists thought truth was established, through 
general agreement. If enough people believe it, then something must be true right? 
That is what the flexibility of the world market seems to allow these days. 
Hardt and Negri seem to support such a reading of their take on the ideology 
of the world market. The reason the world market contains within it no 
contradictions is because of what Hardt and Negri call real subsumption. Real 
subsumption seems to be similar to the deterritorialization of a thing only to have 
that thing reterritorialized into a commodity. Hardt and Negri write that "through 
the real subsumption, the integration of labor into capital becomes more intensive 
than extensive and society is ever more completely fashioned by capital" (255). 
Because capitalism as an economic system has engulfed the geographic world, it has 
no more physical room to expand. Thus, it turns in on itself and begins the process 
of real subsumption. Instead of looking to an outside, capitalism looks at its parts, 
commodities, and breaks down those commodities and tries to put the pieces 
together to form new commodities. A newly published book, for example, will first 
be released in hard cover, and then will be released in a soft cover. Generally, when 
a book is first released you can get that same book on tape or CD. While the 
packaging may be different, consumers are still buying the same information, the 
content of the book. When the society is "completely fashioned by capital" (255) and 
anything can be a commodity, where will the contradiction arise? 
What I hope to have shown in this chapter is that the theory of rhetorical situation 
has a definite place in the Western rhetorical tradition. This place is somewhere 
between Foucault and Aristotle. Also, I have explained my understanding of the 
relationship between sophism and capitalism, mostly that the relationship is one of 
conceptual similarity. In the following chapter, I discuss in detail how to move the 
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theory of rhetorical situation from a merely explanatory theory to a more critical 
theory capable of intervening in the world. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE RHETORICAL SITUATION'S CURRENT LIMITATIONS 
In chapter one, I reviewed Bitzer's theory of rhetorical situation and 
introduced a notable critique of the theory, raised by Vatz, which focused on the 
theory's inability to account for a rhetor's decision of what is exigent. However, 
Vatz's ultimate concern remained within the sphere of rhetoric and did not further 
consider the social implications that the theory and its lack of consideration for the 
rhetor's choice in determining exigence might have. After reviewing Bitzer's theory 
and Vatz' critique in the first chapter, in the second chapter I situated Bitzer's theory 
within the Western rhetorical tradition to call attention to two useful aspects of the 
theory: the theory provides a helpful heuristic for navigating an increasingly 
complicated realm of social relations, but it also allows for the study of contingency 
and situatedness, which is necessary to explore in a world governed by the 
commodification and consumption of the capitalist economic order. 
In the third chapter, I will argue that even while Bitzer's theory allows for the 
contingency and situatedness that is necessary given today's social and economic 
order of global capitalism, the theory remains only an explanatory theory. But 
because the theory is focused on change, given that its central concern is how 
humans work to alter their environment to survive and flourish, I would like to take 
what is an explanatory theory and make it a critical theory capable of exacting 
material change in the world. What follows in this chapter is an explanation of how 
the theory is merely explanatory and an argument for transforming Bitzer's theory 
into a critical theory. My argument here will revolve around an example application 
of the theory, which will discuss the different exigences and impacts of the Montreal 
and Kyoto environmental treaties. 
Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation, while a powerful explanatory tool, 
remains explanatory because the end of his theory is to explain how it is that some 
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humans harmoniously adjust to their environment, while others are forced to corne 
to terms with their environment. However, the full impact of Bitzer's theory is 
limited because Bitzer neglects the important theoretical difference between 
explanation and change that Marx asserted in his Theses on Feuerbach: "the 
philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, 
is to change it" (German Ideology 123). More pointedly, the full application of 
theory must do more than interpret and explain; the application must materially 
affect the world. Because the rhetorical situation interprets rhetorical acts and their 
situations but does little itself to attempt to alter the world, it might also be said that 
the theory fails to avoid what Jameson calls the "overall contradiction of theory-
how to advance the argument without actually saying anything" (404). For Marx, 
theory is serving its true purpose only when it has clear material effects. While 
Bitzer's theory explains how some people make changes to their environments to 
ensure their survival, Marx's vision of the task of theory advocates a more specific 
use of theory, one that critically approaches the changes resulting from rhetorical 
acts to question why some humans are able to harmoniously adjust to the 
environment while others are forced to corne to terms with their environment. Such 
a critical theory of rhetorical situation would not accept social injustice which is 
sometimes associated with a capitalist society as a mere component in the 
environment in which the rhetorical act is occurring. 
In other words, while we need to understand how to navigate 
communicatively in the world, we also need to be empowered with the idea that we 
can change the world more than what is necessary for our sheer survival. The 
question, then, is how humans go beyond mere survival and make the world a 
better place. Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation helps us, as I showed in the 
first and second chapters, understand the rhetorical situation's constituents, but we 
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need a critical theory of the rhetorical situation to negotiate the power dynamics 
within the situation and navigate the complexities of actual social situations in real 
time. In arguing for a critical theory, I propose to redefine the rhetorical situation 
along the lines that Horkheimer argues: critical theory describes "a definite 
individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a 
particular class, and finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social 
totality and with nature" (54). However, while Bitzer's theory considers a specific 
moment with specific actors in specific material situations, and thus partially 
meeting Horkheimer's definition of critical theory, analysis generated from the 
rhetorical situation does not necessarily consider the dynamic social forces existent in 
the situation. Nor does such analysis necessarily consider that systematically 
institutionalized injustice may exist in the material environment in which the 
analyzed rhetorical act takes place. I contend, however, that although the rhetorical 
situation does not necessarily take such things into account, the theory is capable of a 
critical dimension because it calls for looking at materially situated moments. 
The Explanatory Power of the Rhetorical Situation: Montreal versus Kyoto 
The theory of rhetorical situation is useful for exploring why some rhetorical 
acts succeed and other fail. The following is an example of some of the analysis that 
may be generated from Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation, as the theory is 
discussed in the more detailed 1980 revision, "Functional Communication." The 
analysis follows a brief overview of the Montreal and Kyoto treaties and their 
rhetorical situations. I have included this analysis in an effort to show how 
powerful the theory of rhetorical situation can be in explaining the success or failure 
of rhetorical acts; however, at the same time, I am hoping to show that while we 
know something about the success and failure of the rhetorical acts, we know 
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nothing about what to do next. The theory merely explains what works and what 
does not work, but does not explain what the next step should be in an instance 
when an exigence which has not been remedied, must be remedied. 
The Montreal and Kyoto treaties both address the universal exigence of 
global ecological crises, but Montreal is focused on the issue of ozone depletion due 
to emission of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), while Kyoto is concerned with global 
warming due to greenhouse gas emissions. While both treaties are concerned with 
ecological crises, an exigence for all who inhabit the Earth, only Montreal led to the 
alleviation of the crisis it was addressing. In "Montreal versus Kyoto," Scott Barrett 
discusses differences surrounding the two treaties and their respective ecological 
crises in his own attempt to determine why Montreal was successful while Kyoto 
failed. Barrett's article was published in 1999 and more countries than he mentions 
have since ratified the Kyoto treaty, but my analysis focuses on the earlier years of 
the Kyoto treaty. 
Specifically I will apply segments of the rhetorical situation that focus on the 
factors that affect responsiveness to exigence, particularly the factors that affect the 
degree of interest in an exigence. For the sake of length, I've limited my focus to two 
segments of the rhetorical situation: obligation and expectation and some of the six 
factors that affect degree of interest in an exigence. During my analysis I am 
assuming that global warming is a result of increased greenhouse gas emissions, 
meaning that an ecologically based policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is 
sound? In the following section I will explain the roles obligation and expectation 
7 I am not without reason for my assumption that global warming is indeed an ecological threat. 
Other scholars have written about their concern over the use of scientific uncertainty, a trick of the 
deconstructionists, to discount the threat of global warming. See Latour, Bruno. "Why Has Critique 
Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern." Critical Inquiry. 30 Winter 2004: 
225-248. 
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and the factors affecting the degree of interest in an exigence play in determining 
human responsiveness to an exigence. After each explanation, I discuss each factor 
in relation to the Montreal and Kyoto treaties. 
Obligation and Expectation 
Bitzer argues that an audiences' responsiveness to an exigence varies 
depending on whether the speaker and/or audience is obligated or expected to 
respond. More generally, a person may be more inclined to respond to an exigence 
if he/she knows that he/she is expected to respond to that exigence. For instance, if a 
sibling sees her brother being maltreated on the playground at school, she might be 
more inclined to help her brother, knowing that her parents expect her to help look 
after him while the children are at school. The same general logic describes Bitzer's 
sense of obligation. For example, in most homes, children are taught that lying is 
wrong and such a belief may make a person feel obliged to reveal a liar, especially if 
the person believes a lie to be hurtful and thus an exigence. 
But the Kyoto treaty offers a more complex example of the role obligation and 
expectation play in determining the responsiveness to an exigence. That is, a 
stipulation of the Kyoto treaty called for reduced emissions of greenhouse gases 
from industrial countries. One might think that, because the United States, an 
industrialized nation heavily dependent upon the use of fossil fuels that emit 
greenhouse gases, is undeniably responsible for emitting a disproportionate amount 
of greenhouse gases, the US would feel obligated to reduce those gases to remedy 
the exigence of global warming. But the United States pulled out of discussions 
concerning the treaty. 
The lack of a clear obligation in this case to remedy the exigence may explain 
the results of Kyoto for the US. The Kyoto treaty did not call for emission limitations 
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to be set for all nations, just industrial countries and transition economies (Barrett 
208). Because the US is so dependent upon fossil fuels and because not all countries 
were obligated to limit emissions, the US might not have felt obligated to reduce 
emissions. Furthermore, Barrett explained that because not all countries faced limits 
on greenhouse gases, emissions from those nations not required to limit greenhouse 
gases could make up for the reduced emissions from those nations with limits. Thus 
Barrett concluded, "global emissions may fall less than if limits were imposed on all 
signatories" (207). It could be suggested that perhaps the US did not feel obligated 
to lower its emissions, since reduced gases in the US alone would not make a 
significant difference in total global greenhouse gas levels. 
Ultimately, this example illustrates how obligation to remedy the exigence of 
global warming can determine the success of a rhetorical act, in this case the Kyoto 
treaty. In other words, the US could have been functioning on a cost/benefit analysis 
to decide to participate in the Kyoto Treaty talks, and the logic of cost/benefit 
analysis creates a feeling of expectation for nations: if the costs outweigh the benefits 
of action, there is no expectation that a proposed action be taken. However, if the 
benefits outweigh the costs, then logically and morally a nation's people might 
expect their state to alleviate an exigence, such as global warming. In the case of the 
Kyoto Treaty, the US may have seen the cost of limiting greenhouse gas emissions as 
too great for the few clear benefits, thus limiting or negating any expectation that the 
US participate in or take seriously the Kyoto Treaty discussion. 
Degree of Interest 
The degree of interest in an exigence may also in part explain the failure of 
the Kyoto treaty for the US. Bitzer explains that, "other things being equal, 
responsiveness [to an exigence] depends on the degree of interest experienced in the 
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apprehension of an exigence" (FC 31). Six factors, according to Bitzer's detailed 
discussion of the rhetorical situation, affect a rhetor's or audience's responsiveness 
to an exigence: the probability of the exigence obtaining, knowing the exigence 
versus knowing of the exigence, nearness of the exigence in place or time, the 
greatness of the exigence, personal involvement in the exigence, and type of interest 
one takes in the exigence. For the sake of length, I will limit myself to discussing 
four of these in relation to the Montreal and Kyoto treaties: probability of the 
exigence obtaining, knowing the exigence versus knowing of the exigence, nearness 
of the exigence in place and time, and personal involvement in the exigence. 
Probability of an exigence obtaining. The first factor that affects the interest 
level of the rhetorical situation's participants is the probability of the factual 
component obtaining. Bitzer writes, "A factual condition thought improbable or 
unbelievable ordinarily does not solicit interest sufficient to motivate a pragmatic 
response" (FC 32). That is, if a person does not believe the condition that will create 
an exigence is likely to obtain, that person is unlikely to take interest in the exigence. 
In the issue of global warming, Barrett claims that the reason for the lack of 
progress in implementing policy to curb global warning is "not that climate change 
is a more recent discovery and subject to greater uncertainties. That the world's 
climate would change as concentrations of greenhouse gases increased was 
observed a century ago" (192). He claims instead that the Kyoto treaty failed due to 
a "lack of political will" (193). Where the scientific certainty wavered, then, is not in 
the cause of the phenomenon, but in the benefits to be seen from reducing 
greenhouse emissions as called for by the Kyoto treaty. In other words, the factual 
condition that did not obtain was not the global warming phenomenon itself; rather 
it was the factual condition of the possible public good that would come out of the 
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costly reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. There was doubt that the rates of 
decreased emissions called for in the Kyoto treaty would make enough of a 
difference to warrant the cost that such reductions would entail. 
The Kyoto treaty, then, according to the rhetorical situation, may have been 
implemented had the audience for the treaty believed that implementing the treaty 
would have led to the factual condition of slowing global warming. As the Kyoto 
treaty is, however, the policies included do not do enough to lead nations to believe 
that implementing those policies will bring about the factual condition of slowing 
global warming. We thus see in this example that the factual condition called for in 
the Kyoto treaty did not convince the US and other non-signatories that the exigence 
of global warming could be remedied by the treaty's measures. 
Knowing the factual condition of an exigence versus knowing of the 
factual condition of an exigence. The second factor at work in determining the 
degree of interest of the speaker and audience in the exigence, according to Bitzer, 
comes in knowing the factual condition as opposed to merely knowing of the 
condition. Bitzer offers the holocaust as an example of something that affects all, but 
whose true terror is not known by all; this distinction is evident in the difference 
between reading an encyclopedia's description of the events of the holocaust and 
reading the account of the events of the holocaust from a survivor such as Elie 
Wiesel. Bitzer concludes that 1/ generally interest will increase insofar as the factual 
condition is known directly and sensibly, or through vivid representation" (FC 32). 
For a factual condition to be known directly and/or sensibly, one must either see first 
hand or somehow vividly experience the condition. 
The difference between knowing and knowing of an exigence may explain 
the failure of the Kyoto treaty in the US. That is, it is generally agreed that global 
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warming and ozone depletion are "global in that all countries emit ozone-depleting 
substances and greenhouse gases, all are affected by such emissions and effective 
management of those problems requires cooperation involving many if not all 
countries" (Barrett 192). Thus, all know they are affected by the exigence of the 
ecological crises of ozone depletion and global warming. Yet only the Montreal 
treaty's policy concerning ozone depletion, in contrast to Kyoto's policy, has been 
implemented. The condition of vividly knowing the factual condition of an exigence 
may explain why the Montreal treaty has been ratified in the United States, as well 
as in most other nations, whereas the Kyoto treaty has only in 2005, nearly a decade 
after its introduction, been ratified by enough nations to make it legally binding. 
Importantly, according to BBC News, even in 2005 "the world's top polluter, the US, 
has not signed onto the treaty" (par.4). 
Montreal's success outshines Kyoto'S, I contend, because not all countries 
truly knew the factual condition of global warming in the way that all knew of the 
factual condition of global warming. For instance, some nations felt the threat of 
global warming more vividly than others, especially those already having difficulty 
growing crops for food, while other nations' natural resources made global 
temperature change less of a threat. Specifically, the US may see depleted crop 
production, but will likely produce enough to sustain its livelihood, and thus may 
not know the factual condition of global warming in the same way a nation with a 
smaller amount of arable land knows the factual condition of global warming. 
Accordingly, the United States and its people will not be as interested in the 
exigence of global warming or in implementing costly policies that may reduce 
emissions of the gases that cause global warming. The cost-benefit analysis 
considered during the Montreal treaty talks, on the other hand, illustrates how the 
United States will know the factual condition of ozone depletion; Barrett writes that 
39 
cost-benefit analyses "found that by 2165 implementation of the Montreal Protocol 
would avoid more than 245 million US cancer cases and more than 5 million early 
deaths" (200). It is apparent from Barrett's figures that the United States saw an 
interest in working to stop ozone depletion, which was probably a factor that led to 
the US's implementation of the Montreal Protocol. In this example, knowing a 
factual condition generated more interest for the audience of a rhetorical act than the 
amount of interest generated by merely knowing of a factual condition. 
Temporal/spatial relationship to exigence. The temporal/spatial location of 
an exigence may shed some more light on why the Montreal and Kyoto treaties had 
such different results. Bitzer distinguishes between location and time and explains 
that if an exigence can be shown to occur within the near future and physically close 
to the audience, that exigence will be interest the audience. 
The temporal/spatial factor can be cited in the early failure of the Kyoto 
treaty. That is, the results of the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that the 
treaty called for were not clearly shown to ensure a positive resolution of the 
problem of global warming. The results were simply too uncertain and would be 
seen too many years down the road to justify to the signatory nations the actions the 
Kyoto Treaty called for. The time and location of an exigence in this example 
factored into the interest the signatory nations took in the exigence and its remedy. 
Personal involvement with an exigence. The fourth and last factor I will 
discuss that decides interest in an exigence is the extent to which the exigence will 
personally affect the audience. Bitzer explains that an "exigence that involves [the] 
speaker or audience personally will generate more interest than one in which they 
are not directly involved" (Fe 32). Barrett's article as a whole offers a fitting 
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example for this factor. "Montreal versus Kyoto" focuses partly on the economics of 
ozone depletion and global warming, wherein cost-benefit analysis is the basis of 
deciding environmental policy. Importantly, cost-benefit analysis exemplifies the 
way nations determine their individual interest and involvement in a given 
situation. 
In general, Barrett revealed that when benefits for the US were shown to 
outweigh the costs significantly, the US took positive action, as is the case with the 
Montreal Treaty. On the other hand, Barrett showed that the Kyoto Treaty posed 
too many costs and offered too few benefits for the US to pursue. In this cost-benefit 
logic, we see the ways in which the rhetorical situation hinges on the role personal 
interests, or in this case, of individual nations, play in responsiveness to an exigence. 
In the four factors that decide the audience's interest in an exigence, and in 
the theory's explanation of the Montreal and Kyoto treaties' results, the applicability 
of Bitzer's theory to current rhetorical acts is evident. That is, in delineating the 
features of the rhetorical situation, the theory can explain why some rhetorical acts 
succeed while others fail. In this case, the analysis demonstrated why the Montreal 
treaty was readily ratified while the Kyoto treaty had little success. 
The Social End of the Rhetorical Situation and What Might Lurk beneath the 
Theory's Surface 
However, as I have said, Bitzer's theory of the rhetorical situation can be 
more significantly useful if it is moved beyond its explanatory function and is made 
to be a critical theory. To move in this direction, the rhetorical situation, and the 
above analysis generated from its application, can be compared to Marx's analysis of 
capitalism in sections two and three of the first volume of Capital. In these chapters, 
Marx assesses wage labor and admits that, on the surface, the laborer and the 
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employer appear to be free and equal co-subjects, willingly making a contract in 
which both parties benefit and are content. Similarly, the rhetorical situation as 
Bitzer has written it seems to account for enough of the rhetorical situation to have 
significant explanatory power, but only as long as we leave the situation itself in 
tact. That is, Marx thought there might be more to capital than what is apparent, 
due to the inability of "free and equal exchange" to explain surplus value, which, he 
discovers, is based on the inherent exploitation of the wage laborer. As Marx does 
in Capital, we must dig below the apparent "situation" of the rhetorical situation to 
understand the capacity for rhetors to perform effective rhetorical acts. 
Generally, we must look carefully beneath the surface of rhetorical acts and 
their apparent situations in order to move the rhetorical situation towards a more 
critical rhetorical theory. By doing so, we can dismantle the ground of the rhetorical 
situation itself and analyze the root causes of exigencies. While on the surface it 
would seem that Bitzer has accounted for the factors affecting responsiveness to an 
exigence, perhaps if we reconsider the theory knowing that rhetorical acts take place 
in a specific economic and social system (i.e., capitalism), we find that additional 
components factor into the rhetorical situation. 
Looking beneath the surface may thus require us to adopt new categories in 
the rhetorical situation. For instance, not only do we need to look at the degree of 
interest a person has in an exigence or the audience's temporal/spatial relation to the 
exigence, but we also need to consider the rhetor's and audience's economic, social, 
cultural, and political position. While Bitzer's theory begins to consider the 
relationship between speaker and audience, such consideration would allow for 
categories that take into account the situation's social totality by considering the 
rhetor's and audience's place within that totality and the effects that social 
placement have on understanding the exigence. Categories that take into account 
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the cultural and socio-economic roles of the rhetor and audience, I argue, can lead 
Bitzer's theory towards Horkheimer's critical theory, in which the rhetor's 
relationships to the audience and the social whole are central. 
Considering a rhetor's or audience's place in the social totality can reveal the 
political, social, and economic power of these people to allow for more complete 
analysis. Such analysis, which takes into account the rhetor's social orientation, can 
more clearly reveal why a rhetorical act attempting to remove an exigence might fail 
and leave the rhetor merely to come to terms with his/her environment. To 
understand the rhetorical situation as completely as possible, I propose to read 
Bitzer's theory with an emphasis on its social characteristics, which would render a 
more useful reading of Bitzer's theory. 
The beginning of this critical reading of Bitzer's theory can be found in 
Bitzer's own description of his rhetorical theory. Bitzer defines rhetoric's social role, 
as presented in "Functional Communication," as a "function, or pragmatic, [form of] 
communication and thus a critical mode of functional interaction in which the chief 
interacting grounds are persons on the one hand and the environment on the other" 
(FC 21). In other words, rhetoric is a tool used to facilitate the relations between 
humans and their surroundings, and his theory of the rhetorical situation seeks to 
explain those relations. 
In short, the rhetorical situation is centered on change. This focus can be seen 
in the rhetorical situation's components, especially exigence. This need for 
adjustment to the environment is what Bitzer calls "a problem or defect, something 
other than it should be" (FC 23). Bitzer claims in "Functional Communication" that 
"our existence and well-being depend upon skillful and ongoing adjustments to, or 
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modifications of, our environmentB" (FC 22, emphasis added). In other words, the 
human population only survives and flourishes through changing to suit the 
environment. Exigence and the alleviation of exigence, through changes in the material 
and social environment, are thus necessary components of the rhetorical situation. 
Moreover, the rhetorical situation exists only when humans attempt to 
modify or alleviate an exigence through discourse, making such modifications and 
alleviations public. In fact, Bitzer's rhetorical situation contains additional 
constituents beyond exigence that reveal the social nature of his theory: audience 
and constraints. Bitzer's theory requires an audience because "only by means of [the 
audience's] mediating influence can the exigence be modified," but he admits that 
because we as humans "address ourselves pragmatically," the "self is sometimes 
rhetor and audience" (Fe 23). Both the audience and the constraints emphasize the 
social nature of the rhetorical situation. 
The constituent of audience is therefore public, though Bitzer admits that 
people can be both rhetor and audience. While the audience is obviously public and 
social when it exists beyond the rhetoric itself, what really makes the audience social 
is the way exigence is socially created. I will discuss in more detail the social nature 
of exigence later. But let me say here that constraints, those things "capable of 
influencing the rhetor and an audience" (FC 23), are public only insofar as humans 
have access to the particular constraints allowed by their socio-economic status. For 
instance, because I do not have the money, an important constraint, necessary to 
publicize and stage a concert in an effort to raise awareness of global warming, I am 
8 It is important to know, especially in a discussion including Marx's ideas, what Bitzer means by 
environment and situation. There are two different components to Bitzer's total environment: the 
mental environment, which consists of "ideals, images, meanings, symbols, laws, rules, conventions, 
attitudes, feelings, interests, and aspirations" (22 FC), and the physical environment. It is the total 
environment that Bitzer is referring to when he uses the term "environment" and it is the total 
environment that humans perpetually interact with and change. 
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not as able to help alleviate global warming through discourse. I am, instead, left to 
my own devices, such as recycling, walking to work, and possibly maintaining a 
website, all of which might do little good to alleviate global warming. We see from 
this example that socio-economic status plays a role in a rhetor's exposure to 
constraints, thus making constraints public, but also differential among actors. 
Though the rhetorical situation's two primary constituents, audience and 
constraints, are public, the third constituent of the rhetorical situation, exigence, is 
what makes the rhetorical situation especially public and social. Exigence is social 
because, importantly, it is through socialization that we determine the way our 
environment is supposed to appear. Moreover, Bitzer's theory accounts for the role 
socio-economic status plays in determining exigence when he writes that we 
recognize problems or exigences because of a "fundamental proposition grounded 
in individual and collective experience: that the environment and persona invite 
change" (FC 26). In other words, we see something is amiss in the environment 
from our individual and collective experience of that environment. In fact, Bitzer 
goes on to explain that "an exigence is an imperfection marked by some degree of 
urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something to be corrected. It is necessarily 
related to interested and valuations" (FC 26). Thus, not only is there an individual 
and collective experience to draw from when determining exigence, but the urgency 
of an exigence is determined by our values and interests, both of which are 
socialized into us. This allows a space for a discussion of socio-economic status in 
the rhetorical situation. The differential effects a person's socio-economic status 
might have on determining what is exigent can be seen in the following example. A 
person faced with the exigence of famine will urgently desire an alteration in his/her 
environment, such as rain that enables crops to grow, thus enabling that person to 
eat; at the same time, a middle-school child from suburban Iowa may urgently 
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desire an alteration in his/her environment that allows him/her the ability to 
purchase the newest video game so that he/she can hang out with the popular kids. 
In terms of exigence, we see that the starving person needs food to survive, while 
the child desires the newest game merely for the social benefits the game would 
bring; the person wanting food is merely driven by that person's desire to live, while 
the child's need for the newest game is driven by the value that the child places on 
being popular. These are entirely different exigencies, but what we see in this 
example is that our material environment, especially our socio-economic status, 
plays a large role in determining exactly what we as humans consider to be an 
exigence, or that which is other than it should be. That is, the different desires of the 
starving person and the suburban child are more than mere matters of different 
perspectives or goals; the different exigencies are determined in large part by socio-
economic status. 
Generally, because socio-economic situation plays a significant role in 
determining what a person holds as valuable or necessary, or exigent, the rhetorical 
situation's constituent of exigence is primarily social. Bitzer's consideration of the 
factors that determine human responsiveness to exigence, moreover, allow a 
relativity in defining what is exigent from situation to situation. He lists many 
influences that affect how humans respond to exigencies, including: modification 
capability, risk, obligation and expectation, familiarity and confidence, immediacy, 
and degree of interest, which has six factors that impact the level of interest. The 
point to note here is that these factors affecting response to exigencies are socially 
structured and differentiated from person to person. 
The last aspect of Bitzer's theory relevant to my discussion of the social 
nature of the rhetorical situation is a distinction Bitzer makes concerning the role 
rhetoric plays in aiding society. At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Bitzer to 
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discuss the purpose of rhetorical acts, which is to answer how it is that humans 
"harmoniously adjust" to their environment. Until now in the discussion of the 
social aspects of the rhetorical situation, adjustment in the form of alleviation of 
exigence through altering the environment has been defined as rhetoric's goal; 
however, Bitzer notes that "we come to terms with the environment and ourselves" 
(FC 38). The language of coming to terms is important here: it seems there may be 
two scenarios that can occur in any rhetorical situation: harmonious adjustment with 
or of the environment, or coming to terms with the environment. 
In Bitzer's theory, I argue, one who harmoniously adjusts IS one whose 
exigence is solved through the modification of the environment, while one who 
comes to terms with the environment does so because the exigence arises out of an 
environmental disagreement that appears to be irreconcilable. Moreover, the 
difference between these two types of outcomes varies along socio-economic 
divisions. The socio-economic status of an individual in any rhetorical situation is 
merely part of that individual's environment, and Figure 1 shows the relationship 
between socio-economic status and "harmonious adjustment" or "coming to terms" 
with the environment. 
Lower Socio-Economic Status Higher Socio-Economic Status 
Limited control over {----} Constraints {----} Greater control over constraints 
constraints 
Experience difficulty rallying an Greater command over audience because of maintenance of the 
audience, due to a lack in social {----} Audience {----} means of production and means of 
status as a result of having a lower 
socio-economic status alleviation of exigence through 
control of constraints 
Fewer exigences solved because of 
lack of access to constraints, which More exigences solved, which 
limits ability to move audiences {----} Exigence {----} allows for "harmonious 
through discourse to alleviate adjustment" to the environment 
exigences 
Figure 1. Constituents of the rhetorical situation in relation to socio-economic 
status 
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Figure 1 illustrates that some must merely come to terms with their 
environment because their exigences are not alleviated and that this outcome tends 
to happen to individuals with a lower socio-economic status. Consider the example 
of those fighting against the ecological crises of global warming: many of these 
individuals must come to terms with their exigence because it is not being solved 
through alterations to the environment. John Bellamy Foster, in The Vulnerable 
Planet, describes this coming to terms: 
As long as prevailing social relations remain unquestioned, those who 
are concerned about what is happening are left with few visible 
avenues for environmental action other than purely personal 
commitments to recycling and green shopping, socially untenable 
choices between jobs and the environment, or broad appeals to 
corporations, political policymakers, and the scientific establishment-
the very interests most responsible for the current ecological mess. (12) 
In other words, environmentalists who see an exigence in the ecological crises of the 
world are only able to come to terms with their environment because they do not 
have access to the constraints or the audiences needed to alter the environment in a 
way that would allow for harmonious adjustment. For environmentalists, as Foster 
explains, those who have the access to constraints and the ability to gather and hold 
an audience, both of which are necessary to make needed changes to the 
environment, are the very people whose individual interests prevent them from 
doing so. In explicitly Marxist terms, those who have access to the constraints and 
the audiences are those who create the hegemony of the current social system, 
capitalism, which tends to resist environmentalist action. 
In my analysis of the rhetorical situations of the Montreal and Kyoto treaties, 
I illustrated the significant role the rhetorical situation plays in the different 
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successes of these two rhetorical acts, broadly defined. While both treaties seem to 
be responding to similar exigences, global ecological crises, the treaties took two 
very different paths. All of the reasons for the treaties' different fates cannot be 
known, but the path each treaty took was likely was affected by each treaty's 
rhetorical situation, and part of what was different about the rhetorical situations of 
the two treaties were the industries the treaties' policies would affect. The power 
differential between the two industries was one of the biggest differences between 
the rhetorical situations of the two treaties. 
After placing the theory of rhetorical situation between Aristotle and 
Foucault due to the theory's ability to work as an applicable heuristic and yet is 
capable of working in contingency and situatedness and having shown the power of 
the theory of rhetorical situation to explain the success and failures of the rhetorical 
acts of Montreal and Kyoto treaties, I moved on to discuss a second reading of the 
theory of rhetorical situation. The second reading calls for digging below the 
surface of the rhetorical situation in an effort to reveal more constituents, such as 
cultural norms, socio-economic factors, etc., that playa role in the success or failure 
of rhetorical acts. I argue that such a deeper, more involved reading of the theory of 
rhetorical situation must be considered given the unique moment of global 
capitalism. 
Specifically, what we may learn about rhetorical acts from a rhetorical 
analysis generated from the application of an expanded rhetorical situation is that 
there are simply social hurdles that disallow for the resolution of exigences for 
specific persons or groups. For instance, we might have learned through an 
expanded analysis of the rhetorical situations of the Montreal and Kyoto treaties that 
the economic power of the industries involved effect what policies those in political 
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power in the US will subscribe to through means of lobbying and P ACs. Marx saw 
institutionalized systemic injustice in the exploitation that capitalism induces; for 
our part, an expanded rhetorical situation may help us seek out those injustices, call 
attention to them, and thus find ways of making significant changes in the social 
system itself that can ease or, in the best of worlds, eradicate the injustices. 
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